By explicitly accounting for the interaction between importers and corrupt customs officials, the paper argues that setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits the ability of public officials to extract bribes from importers, and can therefore deliver higher government revenues and welfare than the optimally-set (Ramsey) tariff benchmark when corruption is pervasive. If the government's main objective is to raise revenues at the minimum welfare cost, optimally-set tariff rates will be inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand of imports, and thus will generally differ across goods. Such a menu of tariff rates endows custom officials with the opportunity to extract rent from the importers. If officials have sufficient discretionary power, they might threaten to misclassify goods into more heavily taxed categories unless importers pay them a bribe.
Introduction "If I am born again, I want to come back as a custom official."
Anonymous Thai businessman 2 The issue of a uniform tariff across goods has received substantial attention by both economists and policymakers. Among other things, uniform tariffs have been shown to reduce gains from lobbying for protection and thus enhance economic efficiency, increase the cost to future governments of protecting favored sectors, and in general improve transparency. Notwithstanding its appeal and simplicity, only few countries í Bolivia, Chile, and to some extent Mexico í KDYH VR IDU RSWHG IRU D XQLIRUP WUDGH WD[ structure.
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Besides likely political obstacles to its implementation, the case for uniform tariffs appears to be weakened if the government's main objective is raising revenues. From optimal taxation theory we know that revenues can be raised at the minimum efficiency cost by taxing at higher rates goods with less elastic demand schedules. Optimally set tariff rates would therefore generally differ across goods.
In this work, we show how explicitly accounting for possible interactions between importers and customs officials might alter the normative prescription of optimal taxation theory. In particular, we show that, if the government's objective is to raise revenue at the minimum cost in terms of efficiency, and customs officials are corrupt, a uniform tariff may be preferable to differentiated tariffs, because it may yield the government higher revenues as well as improve welfare.
Whenever tariffs differ across goods, the wedge between them gives customs officials room to extract rents from importers. Corrupt officials might threaten to misclassify imports into more heavily taxed categories unless the importers agree to pay them a bribe. Alternatively, the officials might offer to misclassify goods into less heavily taxed categories in exchange for bribes. We will see that this interaction gives rise to resource transfers among the players and to government revenue losses. Moreover, whenever the bribe increases the effective price paid by importers, import quantity decreases and so does welfare. Finally, the likely bargaining between officials and importers to reach an agreement can be time-consuming and wasteful in itself.
The flexibility of taxing goods at different rates comes therefore at a cost in terms of efficiency, revenues, and time, if officials are corrupt. By restricting the ability of customs officials to appropriate government revenues and to impose unnecessary efficiency losses on the economy, a uniform tariff structure can instead deliver higher revenues and welfare.
Empirical evidence confirms that the diversification of trade tariffs across goods might actually fuel corruption, in that a measure of such diversification − the standard deviation of trade tariffs across goods − appears to be robustly associated with reported corruption across countries.
This argument is relevant to policy in many countries. A standard recommendation to developing countries is to shift away from protectionist regimes in order to obtain efficiency gains (see for example Thomas and Nash 1991) . Often these countries are reluctant to decrease tariff barriers because of the implied fiscal revenue loss. To the extent that customs administrations are plagued by corruption and customs officials appropriate government revenues in the way we described, shifting trade tariffs towards a uniform low level could allow countries to obtain efficiency gains without incurring major revenue losses.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two develops a simple graphical argument illustrating the main points. Section three presents the empirical test. Section four concludes.
Optimal Trade Tariffs à la Ramsey and Corruption
Consider a small open economy where importers are price takers and trade tariffs are set to maximize welfare subject to the constraint that the government raises some revenue R. This is a standard optimal taxation type problem, first formulated by Frank Ramsey. In a two-good world, the government will choose tariffs t 1 and t 2 to maximize the indirect utility from good 1 and good 2, v(·), subject to the constraint of raising revenue R The solution to this problem implies that tariffs on each good will be set to be inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand (ε i ). 4 Therefore, Suppose now that good 1 and good 2 are sufficiently similar that their classification as "good 1 " and "good 2" is not crystal clear. Dishonest customs officials might then try to exploit the wedge between the tariff rates by (a) threatening to classify good 1 as the more heavily taxed good 2 unless paid a bribe or (b) offering to classify good 2 as the less heavily taxed good 1 in exchange for a bribe. 5 In other words, the Ramsey tariff structure endows corrupt customs officials with a form of rent. and x 2 (p 2 ) are demand schedules for import goods 1 and 2, with price elasticities ε 1 > ε 2 .
Because of this, we saw that optimally set tariffs are such that
In both scenarios, bargaining is likely to take place and the bribe will tend to be smaller than the full difference between the tariff rates o t 2 and o t 1 . However, for simplicity, we abstract for now from the dynamics of the bargaining process and assume that the official is able to twist it to her complete favor and can therefore appropriate the entire rent.
The effects of corruption are easily seen in the "threat" case. Because of the bribe, the effective price paid by firm 1 for its good increases. This in turn drives down demand so that only 1 The impact of corruption is now apparent: an efficiency loss accompanied by a revenue loss (in the "threat" case) and a transfer of resources from the firm (in the "threat" case) and from the government (in the "lure" case) to the officials. To the extent that the government must raise other, possibly more distortionary, taxes to recover the , will be lower than the quantity associated with the optimal tariff o t 1 without corruption, but higher than the quantity prevailing if the official were to pocket the whole surplus. This implies, in turn, that the government loses relatively less revenues and also that less is lost in welfare, compared to the case where the full rent accrues to the official.
If payoffs are split 50-50 in the "lure" case, the firm faces a reduced effective tariff rate. This drives up imported quantity of good 2 and, because of this, both welfare and government revenues increase relative to the case where the full rent accrues to the official.
The comparison of the "threat" and "lure" interactions under the 50-50 bargaining rule with the Ramsey benchmark without corruption is likely to produce less startling differences than the case where officials pocket the full rent. Nonetheless, the spirit of the results − that these interactions imply government revenue and possibly welfare losses − stays unchanged.
We carried out this analysis under the implicit assumption that the government does not monitor custom officials. Reversing this assumption would not substantially change the analysis but would introduce complications. Monitoring is likely to decrease the ability of officials to appropriate government resources − or force them to share the spoils with the monitors − and to impose the distortions we described. Nonetheless, evaluating the impact of monitoring would entail weighing its benefits against costs in terms of additional taxation the government must impose to finance it.
The Case of a Uniform Tariff
Consider now the case of a uniform tariff set, for instance, at When compared with Ramsey's benchmark, the uniform tariff induces two effects.
First, the lower tariff on good 2 increases its demand, thereby generating an efficiency gain and an improvement in revenues due to the increase in the tax base. Second, government revenues decrease because good 2 is subject to a lower tax rate. When these two effects are weighed against each other, the Ramsey tariff without corruption not surprisingly dominates the uniform tariff -after all, Ramsey's is the optimal tariff.
However, when compared with Ramsey taxation with corrupt custom officials (the "threat" and "lure" cases combined), the uniform tariff delivers both higher revenues and a welfare improvement. With a uniform tariff, customs officials have no opportunity to misclassify goods and thereby no possibility to divert revenues from the government.
Moreover, both goods are subject to lower effective tariff rates, which implies increased demand for the goods, and an improvement in both efficiency and government revenues. 
The Empirical Test
The argument developed above suggests that countries with highly differentiated trade tariffs across goods should ceteris paribus be more vulnerable to corruption.
It is interesting to see whether this conjecture stands empirical investigation. Relating some measure of corruption in the customs with the standard deviation of trade tariffs across countries provides a natural and simple way test for the claim.
The Global Competitiveness Survey 1998 reports a measure of corruption where customs related bribery is explicitly accounted for. A low value of the index (GCS), which ranges from 1 to 7, indicates "irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan applications". This index is be particularly informative for our purposes since is constructed on the basis of a survey of local entrepreneurs who are the likely players in the interactions we described.
The index covers 72 countries and is available for 1997 or 1998.
Standard deviations of trade tariffs (SDV) are available from World Development
Indicators and UNCTAD for a total of 58 countries. Data are for 1998 or for the closest year available.
GCS and SDV are jointly available for only 35 countries, mostly of the developing world. Figure 3 shows their plot.
A simple regression of GCS on SDV, highlights the expected negative correlation between the two indexes: the coefficient reported in column 1 of table 2 indicates that higher standard deviations of trade tariffs are significantly associated with higher measured corruption (lower values of GCS).
To correct for possible omitted variable bias on the estimated coefficient of SDV, we include in the regression the natural logarithm of income (L_INCOME), to account for the fact that corruption might simply be a function of the level of development of a country; and dummies indicating the legal origin of countries, to capture the effect of structural differences in legal systems.
Finally, SDV might proxy not only for the diversification of tariffs across goods, but also for the degree of uncertainty surrounding the imposition of trade taxes. To avoid misinterpretations of the estimated coefficient on SDV, we include a proxy for the degree of uncertainty in the level of import taxes (UNCERTAINTY).
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When the controls are added, the negative relationship between GCS and SDV persists, though slightly weakened.
A concern in the interpretation of the OLS coefficient on SDV regards the possibility that a highly differentiated trade tariff menu may be endogenous to corruption. It is indeed conceivable that in a highly corrupted regime, powerful customs administrators might lobby for a tariff structure that maximizes their bribe collection. If this were the case, the correlation between GCS and SDV would then reflect a causality running from corruption to standard deviation and not vice versa, as we argue here.
To correct for this possible source of bias, we re-estimate the relationship while The results of the IV estimation are reported in table 2, column 3. The association between corruption and standard deviation of tariffs is robust to instrumenting and significant.
Although we cannot rule out that the GCS index is only an imperfect measure of corruption in customs administration and that the results of the estimation might be driven by the limited number of countries for which the data are available, the evidence presented here suggests an important association between diversification of trade tariff menus and levels of corruption.
Conclusions
By explicitly accounting for the interaction between importers and corrupt customs officials, we have shown that opting for a uniform tariff on import goods can deliver higher revenues and welfare than optimally-set (Ramsey) tariffs when corruption is pervasive. This happens because uniform protection on imports restricts the ability of customs officials to exploit the wedge between tariff rates on different goods and thereby appropriate government revenues and impose efficiency losses on the economy.
An empirical test shows a robust association between standard deviation of trade tariffs and measured corruption across countries, suggesting that a highly diversified trade tariff menu might actually fuel bribe taking behavior.
The message of this paper -that the government faces a trade-off between optimallyset, differentiated tax rates and the distortions that public officials can introduce by exploiting these differences in the tax rates -can be readily generalized to other tax and tariff setting situations. , where X, M, RGDP are export, imports, and GDP in real terms (1987 prices), and PX, PM are export and import prices, respectively. GINI Average Gini coefficient for early nineties. Source: Deininger and Squire (1996) .
